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In this thesis we describe how various rewriting methods in combinatorial group
theory can be used to diffuse information about group elements, which makes it pos-
sible to use these techniques as an important constituent in cryptographic primitives.
We also show that, while most group-based cryptographic primitives employ the com-
plexity of search versions of algorithmic problems in group theory, it is also possible
to use the complexity of decision problems, in particular the word problem, to claim
security of relevant protocols.
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Introduction
The objective of this thesis is to explore how developments in non-commutative group
theory can be applied in public-key cryptography, or asymmetric cryptography. In
particular, we suggest three cryptographic primitives that employ rewriting methods
and problems from combinatorial group theory.
Asymmetric cryptography differs from symmetric (classical) cryptography, which
generally uses a single key that allows for both encryption and decryption of messages.
Symmetric methods for secure transmission of information were the only publicly-
known strategies used before the year 1976. Then after, W. Diffie and M. Hellman
introduced in their seminal paper [13] an ingenious theoretical method of openly
transmitting information securely, and started the development of what is now known
as public-key cryptography, i.e., asymmetric cryptography. Their specific procedure
was later given the name of the Diffie-Hellman protocol.
Behind the alluring appeal of many public-key protocols is their theoretical sim-
plicity along with the alluding use of an inherent one-way function to encrypt mes-
sages: a function f easy to compute in its domain but its inverses f−1(y) are hard
to compute for “most” y in its range. There is more to this, of course; for a crypto-
graphic scheme to be secure, it is crucial that its keys are randomly selected from a
“small” subset from the domain of the one-way function instead of the whole domain.
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Detecting these hard to compute subsets, or computational black holes, is a very
difficult issue and it is the core design topic in applications of a cryptographic primi-
tive. Without these computational black holes any implementation of a cryptographic
primitive would be impossible.
Finding these computational black holes for a one-way function is an important
goal. For example, the time-consuming difficulty in factoring “some” large integers
elicits the RSA protocol—due to Rivest, Shamir and Adleman. RSA is the most com-
mon public-key cryptosystem in use today and the most acclaimed implementation
of one-way functions known to date. Therefore, every aspect of a one-way functions
is central in the design of exchanging data securely.
The security of protocols like Diffie-Hellman and RSA did not appear to be com-
promised (albeit known weaknesses exist), however, a recent report from the NIST
[27] claims that in the very near future quantum computer will bring about the end
of canonical implementations of asymmetric cryptography. Besides the superposition
and entanglement properties from quantum mechanics that allow for fast computing
with a quantum computer, in essence, standard quantum computers work by exploit-
ing the internal properties of the gauge group, or symmetry group, from quantum
electrodynamics: the group of complex number of unit length U(1), which is abelian.
By operating with U(1), a quantum computer is like a quick linear-pattern recog-
nizer, where, metaphorically, left and right are indifferent to it. Hitherto, the general
efficiency of all asymmetric cryptosystems is decided by one-way functions emerg-
ing from the computational complexity intrinsic to finite abelian (or commutative)
groups, which quantum computers can universally handle efficiently.
Quantum computers with approximately 512 qubits are now claimed to be in use
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by companies like Google, Lockheed Martin and government agencies, see e.g. [47].
For these reasons there is a strong interest in designing Post-Quantum Key Exchange
protocols that could resist quantum computer algorithms. In search for these new
cryptographic primitives, post-quantum cryptography has given rise to alternatives
such as finite field, elliptic curve, and lattice based cryptography. However, because
the nature of a quantum computer is deeply rooted in the structure of its gauge group,
it seems reasonable to explore possible enhancements of protocols emanating from a
non-abelian group structure.
In theory a quantum computer that could potentially handle the structure of some
non-abelian groups efficiently would have to use a non-abelian gauge group. However,
for example, a computer using the non-abelian gauge group from quantum cromody-
namics would have to be made from stable quark-gluon plasma, which theoretically
can only be found inside neutron stars. For these reasons we believe non-commutative
groups can deliver the ambition of describing one of these sought-out, non-commuting
asymmetric cryptographic protocols.
A path paving-way towards this desire focuses on the search for group platforms
where the security of the protocol would have different premises from the canonical
models. Take for example Wagner and Magyarik [48], who in 1985 thought of a public-
key protocol based on the unsolvability of the word problem for finitely presented
groups. Although the protocol seems somewhat naive now, it was pioneering. In
particular, it shows that the idea of using the complexity of non-abelian groups in
cryptography is not recent; however, the new interest in applications of non-abelian
group theory to cryptography can be traced to [1, 26, 44].
Group-based cryptography is still in its early stages of development, although it
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has been productively advancing over last decade (see [49] and [35]). The majority of
group-theoretic protocols are based on search problems, which came from traditional
decision problems in combinatorial group theory. In our applications, we employ
both of these problems. Given a property P and an object O, the decision problem
P for O is the problem of deciding whether or not O has the property P ; while the
search problem P is the problem of finding at least one particular object O with
the property P from a pool S of objects whenever there is information that objects
with the property P do exist. For example, the conjugacy search problem [1, 26];
the homomorphism search problem [20], [44]; the decomposition search problem [10,
26, 43] and the subgroup membership search problem [45] are some of the proposed
search based primitives that have been suggested.
Employing a non-abelian group primitive based on a search problem in a non-
abelian group introduces the very challenging problem of determining computational
black holes for the chosen primitive—similar to the canonical model—as any pro-
tocol based on non-abelian groups has to eventually address this issue for practical
implementations. On the other hand, employing decision problems allows for the de-
velopment of cryptographic primitives with new properties, impossible in the canon-
ical model. We address some of these issues by also considering primitives that only
transmit partial information about its elements with the aid of rewriting methods
from combinatorial group theory.
In Chapter 1 we use the decision problems known as the word problem to describe
our cryptographic protocol [46]. This protocol has the following features: (1) Bob
transmits to Alice an encrypted binary sequence which Alice decrypts correctly with
probability “very close” to 1; (2) the adversary, Eve, who is granted arbitrarily high
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(but fixed) computational speed, cannot positively identify (at least, in theory), by
using a “brute force attack”, the “1” or “0” bits in Bob’s binary sequence. In other
words: no matter what computational speed we grant Eve at the outset, there is no
guarantee that her “brute force attack” program will give a conclusive answer (or
an answer which is correct with overwhelming probability) about any bit in Bob’s
sequence.
So far, no protocol based on a search problem for a non-abelian group has been
recognized as secure enough to be a viable alternative to other established protocols.
However, by using the word problem with this probabilistic constraint, we believe
it allows one to depart from the canonical paradigm. In particular, such protocols
can potentially be secure against some “brute force” attacks by a computationally
unbounded adversary.
In Chapter 2 we describe a cryptosystem [45] whose security is based on the
computational hardness of the subgroup membership search problem: given a group
G, a subgroup H generated by h1, . . . , hk, and an element h ∈ H, find an expression
of h in terms of h1, . . . , hk. We believe that using the subgroup membership search
problem also allows one to depart from most public key protocols based on non-abelian
groups, which generally use the computational difficulty of either the conjugacy search
problem or the word search problem. In our protocol, by using a subset of the
Cartesian product of a subgroup H, we allow for use of partial information from our
primitive, and not the whole. Also, in contrast to groups typically used in public-key
cryptography, we suggest the class of free solvable groups as its platform, which are
infinitely presented groups and have efficiently solvable word problem.
In Chapter 3 we derive a rewriting method for group elements that uses the
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concept of a transversal set. A set of transversals T allows us to decompose an
element g ∈ G into two parts, say, g := th, where t ∈ T and h ∈ H. By performing
this decomposition we show how to rewrite the product of any two elements in G in
terms of their respective parts from T and H. Essentially the group G will decompose
into a set T×H, which becomes a group isomorphic to G under the product we derive
from our rewriting method.
Finally, we use the rewriting method developed in Chapter 3 to design a key ex-
change protocol in Chapter 4 that is analogous to the Kahrobaei and Shpilrain scheme
[12]. More specifically, instead of applying the semidirect product as Kahrobaei and
Shpilrain did, we employ the set T ×H for a transversal T of G/H to design a key
exchange primitive resembling the Diffie-Hellman protocol. Despite the difference
between our primitives, both agree on a valuable innovative feature: One does not
have to transmit the entire data, but only a part of it. We also emphasize that our
protocol is less implementation-oriented. Instead, we focus in describing this new
idea and research directions the primitive can open.
The development of the rewriting method of Chapter 3 for implementation in
Chapter 4 illustrates an important feedback that exists between cryptography and
group theory, which is not unexpected since problems motivated by cryptography
are group-theoretical in nature. However, the emphasis of this thesis is to promote
innovations in asymmetric cryptography, and the intuition behind it. Although we
do not address security properties the way they are typically considered in traditional
cryptography, we believe the theoretical work presented here can be promising for
applications. These procedures or generalizations thereof could potentially be applied
with greater efficiency than methods that are currently in use.
Chapter 1
Decision Problems in Public-Key
Cryptography
In search for a more efficient and/or secure alternative to established cryptographic
protocols (such as RSA), several authors have come up with public-key establish-
ment protocols, as well as with complete public key cryptosystems, based on allegedly
hard search problems from combinatorial (semi)group theory, including the conjugacy
search problem [1, 26], the homomorphism search problem [20], [44], the decomposi-
tion search problem [10, 26, 43], the subgroup membership search problem [45]. All
these are problems of the following nature: given a property P and the information
that there are objects with the property P , find at least one particular object with
the property P from a pool S of objects. So far no cryptographic protocol based on
a search problem in a non-commutative (semi)group has been recognized as secure
enough to be a viable alternative to established protocols (such as RSA) based on
commutative (semi)groups.
From the very nature of these problems one sees that the security of the corre-
sponding cryptographic protocols relies heavily on the assumption that the adversary
has only limited computational capabilities. Indeed, there is usually a natural way to
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recursively enumerate elements of the pool S; hereto, the adversary can just go over
S one element at a time until he hits one with the property P (assuming that check-
ing the latter can be done efficiently). This particular adversarial attack strategy is
commonly know as a “brute force” attack.
In this chapter we use decision problems from combinatorial group theory as the
core of a public key establishment protocol or a complete public-key cryptosystem.
Decision problems are problems of the following nature: given a property P and an
object O, find out whether or not the object O has the property P . We show that
decision problems may be useful when one addresses the ultimate challenge of public-
key cryptography: design a cryptosystem secure against brute-force attacks by an
adversary with arbitrarily high computational speed.
In particular, we use the word problem to design a cryptosystem with the follow-
ing features: (1) Bob transmits to Alice an encrypted binary sequence which Alice
decrypts correctly with probability “very close” to 1; (2) the adversary, Eve, who is
granted arbitrarily high computational speed (although limited storage space), can
positively identify the “1” bits in those places of the binary sequence where Bob in-
tended to transmit a 1. However, there is no way for Eve (at least, in theory) to
positively identify the bits in those places where Bob intended to transmit a 0. In
other words: granted an arbitrary speed of computation, Eve’s “brute force attack”
program will run without giving a conclusive answer in those places where Bob in-
tended to transmit a 0 until it reaches the limit on the storage space size (albeit, we
assume the adversary has arbitrary high speed of computation, we do not grant the
adversary unbounded speed of computation.)
In the following sections we address the most relevant and typical questions of
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this chapter; in particular, why encryption (by Bob) and decryption (by Alice) are
efficient, why the receiver (Alice) and the adversary are separated in power, why the
only obvious brute-force attack fail under our computational assumptions, etc.
1.1 Computational Descriptions
We assume an algorithm A to be a deterministic multi-tape Turing machine, adopting
the notion of computational complexity from [37]. A time-complexity class C for A is
a collection of functions bounding the time of the computation. A class C consists of
proper complexity functions f(n) ≥ n, such that for any f ∈ C and any integer c ≥ 1,
the function cf(cn+ c) + c is also in C.
In the following sections of this chapter we assume that the adversary does not
have any externally imposed limit on the speed of computation. More precisely, our
computational model is as follows: we explain to the adversary how our cryptosystem
works and allow him to choose any time-complexity class C for the of computation he
wants to use to attack the cryptosystem; however, he cannot change his choice after
he has made it—i.e., he cannot accelerate his computation beyond the limit he has
chosen for himself.
On the other hand we impose a limit on the adversary’s storage space; however,
this limit is rather generous, so that he cannot run more than 10100 different programs
at the same time. To have such a limit on the size of storage space seems to be
a reasonable assumption because, conceivably, this size cannot possibly exceed the
number of electrons in the observable universe.
Definition 1.1.1. The word problem for a recursive presentation of a group G is the
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algorithmic problem of deciding whether or not g = 1 in G given any g ∈ G.
From the very description of the word problem we see that it consists of two
parts: “whether” and “not”. We call them the “yes” and “no” parts of the word
problem, respectively. If a group is described by a recursive presentation in terms
of generators and relators, then the “yes” part of the word problem has a recursive
solution because one can recursively enumerate all products of defining relators, their
inverses and conjugates. However, the number of factors in such a product required
to express a word of length n that equals 1 in G, can be very large compared to n.
In particular, there are groups G with efficiently solvable word problem and words w
of length n equal to 1 in G, such that the number of factors in any factorization of w
into a product of defining relators, their inverses, and its conjugates, is not bounded
by any tower of exponents in n (cf. [38]).
Furthermore, if the word problem is recursively unsolvable in a group G, the length
of a proof verifying that w = 1 is satisfied in G is not bounded by any recursive
function on the length of w. Moreover the “no” part of the word problem in many
groups is recursively unsolvable, and therefore a “brute force” attack will not be
effective against this part. A group is said to have a recursively enumerable word
problem if it has a recursively solvable answer of “yes” to the word problem and with
a recursively unsolvable answer to the “no” part of the word problem.
Based on this general observation in the following section we design a crypto-
graphic protocol with the following features:
1. Bob transmits to Alice an encrypted binary sequence that Alice decrypts cor-
rectly with probability “very close” to 1;
2. The adversary, Eve, who is granted arbitrarily high (but fixed) computational
11
speed, cannot positively identify (at least, in theory), by using a brute force
attack, the 1 or 0 bits in Bobs binary sequence. In other words: no matter
what computational speed we grant Eve at the outset, there is no guarantee
that her brute force attack program will give a conclusive answer (or an answer
which is correct with overwhelming probability) about any bit in Bobs sequence.
Moreover we emphasize that there was an attempt to use the word problem in
public key cryptography [48] a long-time ago, but it did not meet with success for
several reasons. One of the reasons, which is relevant to the discussion above, was
pointed out quite recently in [7], i.e., the problem that is actually used in [48] is not
the word problem but the word choice problem: Given g, w1, w2 ∈ G, decide whether
g = w1 or g = w2 is true in G whenever one of the two equations holds. This problem
is recursively solvable for any recursively presented platform group G because one
of these equations is the “yes” part of the word problem. Thus, the word choice
problem cannot be utilized for our purpose; any comparison of it’s implementation to
our proposal is misleading; and our design seems to be the first based on an actual
decision problem.
Finally, we note that a security model (named “bounded storage model”) philo-
sophically similar to ours has been considered in private-key cryptography, see [3] and
references thereto. However, in [3] the “bounded storage model” utilizes a public bit
string that is larger than the adversary’s storage capacity. Therefore, their granted
limit on the adversary’s storage capacity is relatively small. In contrast, we grant the
adversary “all storage space in the universe”, so to speak, without losing efficiency in
encryption or asking for a large storage space for legitimate parties.
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1.2 The Word Problem Protocol
In this section we sketch of our cryptographic protocol and we leave the description
of its details for the following sections.
Key Generation: Alice generates a group platform for anyone to encipher.
1. A pool of group presentations with efficiently solvable word problem is
made public (e.g. is part of Alice’s software).
2. Alice chooses randomly a particular presentation Γ from the pool, diffuses
it by isomorphism-preserving transformations to obtain a diffused presen-
tation Γ′, discards some of the relators and publishes the abridged diffused
presentation Γ̂.
Encryption and Decryption: Let Bob encipher while Alice deciphers.
1. Bob transmits his private binary sequence to Alice by sending an element
equal to 1 in Γ̂ (and therefore also in Γ′) in place of “1” and an element
not equal to 1 in Γ′ in place of “0”.
2. Alice recovers Bob’s binary sequence by first converting elements of Γ̂ to
the corresponding (under the isomorphism that she knows) elements of Γ,
and then solving the word problem in Γ.
Each part of this protocol is rather nontrivial and opens several interesting research
avenues. We discuss parts (1), (2), (3) in our Sections 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, respectively.
A priori it looks like the most nontrivial part is finding an element not equal to 1
in Γ′ since Bob does not even know the whole presentation Γ′. We solve this problem
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by “going with the flow”, so to speak. More specifically, we just let Bob select a
random (well, almost random) word of sufficiently big length and show that, with
overwhelming probability, such an element is not equal to 1 in Γ′. We discuss this in
more detail in Section 1.5.
We emphasize once again what is, in our opinion, the main advantage (at least,
theoretical) of our protocol over the existing ones. The point is to deprive the adver-
sary (Eve) from attacking the protocol by doing an “exhaustive search”, which is the
most obvious (although, perhaps, often “computationally infeasible”) way to attack
all existing public key protocol.
The way we plan to achieve our goal is relevant to the first part of the encryption
and decryption part of the protocol, i.e., solving the word problem in Γ̂. If Bob
transmits an element g equal to 1 in Γ̂, Eve will be able to detect it by going over all
products of all conjugates of relators from Γ̂ and their inverses. This set is recursive,
but as we have pointed out in the Introduction, there are even groupsG with efficiently
solvable word problem and words w of length n equal to 1 in G, such that the length
of a proof verifying that w = 1 in G is not bounded by any tower of exponents in n.
However, detecting an element g not equal to 1 in Γ̂ is more difficult for Eve
whenever Bob transmits it. In fact, it is impossible in general; Eve’s only hope here
is that she will be lucky to find a factor group of Γ̂ where the word problem is solvable
and g 6= 1 in that factor. This is what we call a quotient attack, (see Section 1.8.)
Remark. It may look like an encryption protocol with the features outlined in the
Introduction cannot exist; in particular, the following attack by a computationally
superior adversary may seem viable:
Eve can perform key generations over and over again, each time with
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fresh randomness, until the public key to be attacked is obtained—this will
happen eventually with overwhelming probability. Already the correctness
of the scheme (no matter if perfect or only with overwhelming probability)
guarantees that the corresponding secret key (as obtained by Eve while
performing key generation) allows to decrypt illegitimately.
This would be indeed viable if the correctness of the legitimate decryption by
Alice was perfect. However, in our situation this kind of attack will fail for a general
Γ̂. Suppose Eve is building up two lists, corresponding to two possible encryptions
“ 0 w 6= 1 in Γ̂” or “1 w = 1 in Γ̂” by Bob. Our first observation is that
the list that corresponds to “ 0 w 6= 1” is useless to Eve because it is simply
going to contain all words in the alphabet X = {x1, . . . , xn, x−11 , . . . , x−1n } since Bob
is choosing such w simply as a random word. Therefore, Eve may just as well forget
about this list and concentrate on the other one, which corresponds to “1 w = 1”.
Now the situation boils down to the following: if a word w transmitted by Bob
appears on the list, then it is equal to 1 in Γ. If not, then not. The only problem is
the following: how can Eve possibly conclude that w does not appear on the list if
the list is infinite? Our opponent could say here that Eve can stop at some point and
conclude that w 6= 1 with overwhelming probability, just like Alice does. The point
is that this probability may not at all be as “overwhelming” as the probability of the
correct decryption by Alice, however. Compare:
1. For Alice to decrypt correctly “with overwhelming probability”, the probability
P1(N) for a random word w of length N not to be equal to 1 should converge
to 1 (reasonably fast) as N goes to infinity.
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2. For Eve to decrypt correctly “with overwhelming probability”, the probability
P2(N, f(N)) for a random word w of length N , which is equal to 1, generated
by Bob’s algorithm (see Section 1.5), to have a proof of length ≤ f(N) verify-
ing that w = 1, should converge to 1 (reasonably fast) as N goes to infinity.
Here f(N) represents Eve’s computational capabilities; this function can be ar-
bitrary, but fixed. By “proof” here we mean a presentation of w as a product
of conjugates of defining relators and their inverses.
We see that the functions P1(N) and P2(N) are of very different nature, and any
correlation between them is unlikely. We note that the function P1(N) is generally
well understood; in particular, it is known that in any infinite group G the probability
P1(N) indeed converges to 1 as N goes to infinity; see our Section 1.5 for more details.
On the other hand, the functions P2(N, f(N)) are more complex; they are cur-
rently subject of a very active research, and in particular, it appears likely that for
any f(N), there are groups in which P2(N, f(N)) does not converge to 1 at all. Of
course, P2(N, f(N)) may depend on a particular algorithm used by Bob to produce
words equal to 1, but we leave this discussion to another paper.
We also note, in passing, that if in a group G the word problem is recursively
unsolvable, then the length of a proof verifying that w = 1 in G is not bounded by
any recursive function of the length of w.
To conclude this section, we guide the reader to other sections of this paper
where the questions of efficiency (for legitimate parties) are addressed. All steps
of our protocol are shown to be quite efficient with the suggested parameters (the
latter are summarized in Section 1.6). Step (2) of Key Generation of the protocol
(Alice’s algorithm for obtaining her public and private keys) is discussed in Section
16
1.4. Step (2) of the Encryption and Decryption part of the protocol (encryption
by Bob) is discussed in Section 1.5. It turns out that encryption (of one bit) takes
quadratic time in the length of a transmitted word; the latter is approximately 150
on average, according to our computer experiments. Step (2) of the Decryption part
of the protocol (decryption by Alice) is discussed at the end of Section 1.4. It is
straightforward to see that the time Alice needs to decrypt each transmitted word w
is bounded by C · |w|, where |w| is the length of w and C is a constant which basically
depends on Alice’s private isomorphism between Γ and Γ′.
The fact that Alice (the receiver) and the adversary are separated in power is
essentially due to Alice’s knowledge of her private isomorphism between Γ and Γ′
(note that Bob does not have to know this isomorphism for encryption!).
We have to admit here one disadvantage of our protocol compared to most well-
established public-key protocols: we have encryption with a rather big “expansion
factor”. Computer experiments—with suggested parameters—show thatone bit in
Bob’s message gets encrypted into a word of length approximately 150 on average.
This is the price we pay for granting the adversary vast computational power.
Finally, at the end of Section 1.5 we discuss semantic security.
1.3 Pool of Group Presentations
There are many classes of finitely presented groups with solvable word problem known
by now, e.g. one-relator groups, hyperbolic groups, nilpotent groups, metabelian
groups. Note however that Alice should be able to randomly select a presentation
from the pool efficiently, which imposes some restrictions on classes of presentations
that can be used in this context. The class of finitely presented groups that we suggest
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to include in our pool is small cancellation groups.
Small cancellation groups have relators satisfying a simple (and efficiently ver-
ifiable) “metric condition” (we follow the exposition in [30]). More specificaly, let
F (X) be the free group with a basis X = {xi | i ∈ I }, where I is an indexing set. Let
εk ∈ {±1}, where 1 ≤ k ≤ n. A word w(x1, . . . , xn) = xε1i1x
ε2
i2
· · ·xεnin in F (X), with all
xik not necessarily distinct, is a reduced X-word if x
εk
ik
6= x− εk+1ik+1 , for 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1.




. A set R containing cyclically reduced words from F (X) is symmetrized
if it is closed under cyclic permutations and taking inverses.
Let G be a group with presentation 〈X;R〉. A non-empty word u ∈ F (X) is
called a piece if there are two distinct relators r1, r2 ∈ R of G such that r1 = uv1 and
r2 = uv2 for some v1, v2 ∈ F (X), with no cancellation between u and v1 or between
u and v2. The group G belongs to the class C(p) if no element of R is a product of
fewer than p pieces. Also, the group G belongs to the class C ′(λ) if for every r ∈ R
such that r = uv and u is a piece, then |u| < λ|r|.
In particular, if G belongs to the class C ′(1
6
), then Dehn’s algorithm solves the
word problem for G efficiently. This algorithm is very simple: in a given word w, look
for a “large” piece of a relator from R (that means, a piece whose length is more than
a half of the length of the whole relator). If no such piece exists, then w 6= 1 in G. If
such a piece does exist, call it u, then r = uv for some r ∈ R, where the length of v is
smaller than that of u. Then replace u by v−1 in w. The length of the resulting word
is smaller than that of w; therefore, the algorithm will terminate in a finite number
of steps with quadratic-time complexity relative to the length of w.
We also note that a generic finitely presented group is a small cancellation group
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(cf. [2]). Then, to randomly select a small cancellation group, Alice can just take a
few random words and check whether the corresponding symmetrized set satisfies the
C ′(1
6
) condition; otherwise, repeat.
We conclude this section by providing a procedure for Alice to determine a pre-
sentation Γ from the protocol of Section 1.2.
1. Alice fixes a number k, 10 ≤ k ≤ 20, of generators in her presentation Γ. Her
Γ will therefore have generators x1, . . . , xk.
2. Alice selects m random words r1, . . . , rm in the generators x1, . . . , xk. Here
1 < m < k − 2 and the lengths li of ri are random integers from the interval
L1 ≤ li ≤ L2. Particular values that we suggest are: L1 = 12, L2 = 20.





to it, where x′i is a (randomly chosen) generator from Γ̂, wj are random elements
of length 1 or 2 in the generators x′1, x
′
2, . . . , and M = 10. (Our commutator
notation is [a, b] := a−1b−1ab.) This relation is needed to foil quotient attacks,
see Section 1.8. Then Alice finds the preimage of this relation under the iso-
morphism between Γ and Γ̂ and adds this preimage to the defining relators of
Γ. Thus, Γ finally has k generators and m + 1 < k − 1 defining relators. This
ensures, in particular, that the group G defined by Γ is infinite.
4. Finally, Alice checks whether her private presentation Γ satisfies the small can-
cellation condition C ′(1
6
) (which it will with overwhelming probability, see [2]).
If not, she has to restart.
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1.4 Elementary Isomorphisms
In this section, we explain how Alice can implement the remaining steps of part (2) in
the Key Generation part of our Protocol. First we introduce Tietze transformations;
these are “elementary isomorphisms”: any isomorphism between finitely presented
groups is a composition of Tietze transformations. What is important to us is that
every Tietze transformation is easily invertible, and therefore Alice can compute the
inverse isomorphism that takes Γ ′ to Γ.
Tietze introduced isomorphism preserving elementary transformations that can
be applied to groups presented by generators and relators. They are of the following
types.
Tietze Transformations: Given X := {x1, x2, . . . }, let F (X) denote the free group
generated by X.
(T1) Introducing a new generator. Replace 〈x1, x2, . . . ; r1, r2, . . . 〉 as follows:
〈x1, x2, . . . ; r1, r2, . . . 〉 〈y, x1, x2, . . . ; ys
−1
, r1, r2, . . . 〉 ,T1
where s = s(x1, x2, . . . ) ∈ F (X).
(T2) Canceling a generator. Replace 〈y, x1, x2, . . . ; q, r1, r2, . . . 〉 as follows:
〈y, x1, x2, . . . ; q, r1, r2, . . . 〉 〈x1, x2, . . . ; r1, r2, . . . 〉 ,T2
provided q = ys
−1
and s, r1, r2, · · · ∈ F (X).
(T3) Applying an automorphism. Replace 〈x1, x2, . . . ; r1, r2, . . . 〉 as follows:
〈x1, x2, . . . ; r1, r2, . . . 〉 〈x1, x2, . . . ; ϕ(r1), ϕ(r2), . . . 〉 ,T3
where ϕ is an automorphism of F (X).
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(T4) Changing defining relators. Replace 〈x1, x2, . . . ; r1, r2, . . . 〉 as follows:
〈x1, x2, ; r1, r2, . . . 〉 〈x1, x2, ; r′1, r′2, . . . 〉 ,
T4
where the normal closure of the set { r′1, r′2, . . . } is the same as the normal
closure of the set { r1, r2, . . . }.
Tietze proved that two group presentations of the form 〈x1, x2, . . . ; r1, r2, . . . 〉
and 〈x1, x2, . . . ; s1, s2, . . . 〉 are isomorphic if and only if one can get from one of the
presentations to the other by a sequence of transformations (T1)–(T4), cf. [30].
For each Tietze transformation of the types (T1)–(T3), it is easy to obtain an
explicit isomorphism (as a mapping on generators) and its inverse. For a Tietze
transformation of the type (T4), the isomorphism is just the identity map. We would
like here to make Tietze transformations of the type (T4) recursive, because a priori
it is not clear how Alice can actually apply these transformations. Thus, Alice is
going to use the following recursive version of (T4):
(T4′) In the set r1, r2, . . . , replace some ri by one of the: r
−1
i , rirj, rir
−1







k , where j 6= i, and k is arbitrary.
We suggest that in part (2) of the protocol in Section 1.2, Alice should first apply
several transformations of the type (T4′) to “mix” the presentation Γ. (This does
not add complexity to the final isomorphism since for a Tietze transformation of the
type (T4), the isomorphism is just the identity map, as we have noted above.) In
particular, if Γ was a small cancellation presentation (see Section 1.3) to begin with,
then after applying several transformations (T4′) it will, most likely, no longer be. As
a result, Eve’s chances of augmenting the public presentation Γ̂ to a small cancellation
presentation (see Section 1.7) become slimmer.
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After Alice has mixed Γ by transformations (T4′), we suggest that she should aim
for breaking down some of the defining relators into “small pieces”. Formally, she
can replace a given presentation by an isomorphic presentation where most defining
relators have length at most 4. (Intuitively, diffusion of elements should be easier to
achieve in a group with shorter defining relators). This is easily achieved by applying
transformations (T1) (see below), which can be “seasoned” by a few elementary
automorphisms (type (T3)) of the form xi xix
±1
j or xi x
±1
j xi, for better
diffusion.
The procedure of breaking down defining relators is quite simple. Let Γ be
a presentation 〈x1, . . . , xk; r1, ..., rm〉. We are going to obtain a different, isomor-
phic, presentation by using Tietze transformations of types (T1). For example, let
r1 = xixju where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k. We introduce a new generator xk+1 and a new re-
lator rm+1 = xk+1(xixj)
−1
. The new presentation 〈x1, . . . , xk, xk+1; r1, . . . , rm, rm+1〉
is isomorphic to Γ. Now if we replace r1 with r
′
1 = xk+1u, then the presentation
〈x1, . . . , xk, xk+1; r′1, . . . , rm, rm+1〉 will again be isomorphic to Γ, but now the length
of one of the defining relators (r1) has decreased by 1. Continuing in this manner,
Alice can eventually obtain a presentation where many relators have length at most
3, at the expense of introducing more generators. In fact, relators of length 4 are
also good for the purpose of diffusing a given word, so we are not going to “cut” the
relators into too small pieces —i.e., to avoid pieces of length 1 or 2— but rather settle
with relators of length 3 or 4. Most of the longer relators can be discarded from the
presentation Γ′ to obtain the abridged presentation Γ̂.
We conclude this section with a simple example, just to illustrate how Tietze
transformations can be used to cut relators into pieces. In this example, we start
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with a presentation having two relators of length 5 in 3 generators, and end up with
a presentation having 4 relators of length 3 or 4 in 5 generators. The symbol ' below
means “is isomorphic to”.
Example. Let G be a group with presentation 〈x1, x2, x3 ; x21x32, x1x22x−11 x3〉 . Then
G ' 〈x1, x2, x3, x4 ; x4 = x21, x4x32, x1x22x−11 x3〉
' 〈x1, x2, x3, x4, x5 ; x5 = x1x22, x4 = x21, x4x32, x5x−11 x3〉
' 〈x1, x2, x3, x4, x5 ; x5 = x22, x4 = x21, x4x32, x1x5x−11 x3〉 .
The last isomorphism illustrates applying a transformation of type (T3), namely, the
automorphism x5 x1x5 and xi xi for i 6= 5.
1.5 Generating Random Elements in FPG
In this section, we explain how to implement the crucial step (1) for key generation of
the protocol given in Section 1.2. We have to say up front that under the assumption
that the adversary, Eve, has arbitrarily high computational speed, it does not matter
how Bob is going to diffuse an element equal to 1 in Γ̂; Eve will be able to detect
triviality of his element anyway, see discussion in Section 1.2. Still, we include here a
discussion of Bob’s possible diffusion strategy because we believe it might be useful
in real life, where Eve cannot enjoy arbitrarily high computational speed.
When Bob wants to transmit an element equal to 1 in Γ̂, he should construct a
word, looking “as random as possible” (for semantic security), in the relators r̂1, . . . , r̂l
and their conjugates. When he wants to transmit an element not equal to 1 in
Γ̂, he just selects a random word of sufficiently big length; it turns out that, with
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overwhelming probability, such an element is not equal to 1 in Γ′ (we explain it in
the end of this section).
It is rather straightforward to produce a random word of a given length in gener-
ators x1, . . . , xk, so we are not going to discuss it here. On the other hand, when Bob
transmits a word w equal to 1 in Γ̂, he wants to diffuse it so that pieces of defining
relators would not be visible in w. In some specific groups (e.g. in braid groups) a dif-
fusion is provided by a “normal form”, which is a collection of symbols that uniquely
corresponds to a given element of the group. The existence of such normal forms is
usually due to some special algebraic or geometric properties of a given group.
However, since Bob does not know any meaningful properties of the group defined
by the presentation Γ̂ which is given to him, he cannot employ normal forms in the
usual sense. The only useful property that the presentation Γ̂ has is that most of its
defining relators have length 3 or 4, see Section 1.3. We are going to take advantage
of this property as follows. We suggest the following procedure which is probably
best described by calling it “shuffling”.
1. Make a product of the form u = s1 · · · sp, where each si is randomly chosen
among defining relators r1, r2, . . . , their inverses, and their conjugates by one-
or two-letter words in x1, x2, . . . . The number p of factors should be sufficiently
big, at least 10 times the number of defining relators.
2. Insert approximately 2p
k




j xj in random places
of the word u (here k is the number of generators xi), for random values of j.
3. Going left to right in the word u, look for two-letter subwords that are parts of
defining relators ri of length 3 or 4. When you spot such a subword, replace it
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by the inverse of the augmenting part of the same defining relator and continue.
For example, suppose there is a relator ri = x1x2x3x4, and suppose you spot













4 . If there
is more than one choice for replacement, choose randomly between them.





Steps (2)–(4) should be repeated approximately p times for good mixing. Finally,
after Bob has obtained a word u this way, he sets w = [x′i, u] and applies steps (2)–(4)
to w approximately |w|
2
times, where |w| is the length of w. This final step is needed
to make this w (which is equal to 1 in Γ̂, and therefore also in Γ′) indistinguishable
from w 6= 1, which is constructed in the same form w = [x′i, u], see below. Here x′i




i, wj] published by Alice, see Section 1.3.
Having w 6= 1 in this form is needed, in turn, to foil “quotient attacks”, see the end
of Section 1.8.
When Bob wants to transmit an element not equal to 1 in Γ′, he should first
choose a random word u from the commutator subgroup of the free group generated
by x′1, x
′
2, . . .. To select a random word from the commutator subgroup is easy; Bob
can select an arbitrary random word v first, and then adjust the exponents on the
generators in v so that the exponent sum on every generator in v is 0. The length of u
should be in the same range as the lengths of the words u equal to 1 in Γ̂ constructed
by Bob before. Then Bob lets w = [x′i, u], where x
′





i, wj] published by Alice, see Section 1.3. Finally, to hide u, he applies
“shuffling” to w (steps (2)–(4) above) approximately |w|
2
times.
Now we explain why a random word of sufficiently big length is not equal to 1 in
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Γ with overwhelming probability, provided Γ is a presentation described in the end
of Section 1.3.
Like any other group, the group G given by the presentation Γ is a factor group
G = F/R of the ambient free group F generated by x1, x2, . . . . Therefore, to estimate
the probability that a random word in x1, x2, . . . would not belong to R (and therefore,
would not be equal to 1 in G), one should estimate the asymptotic density (see e.g.
[24]) of the complement to R in the free group F . It makes notation simpler if one
deals instead with the asymptotic density of R itself, which is
ρ
F
(R) = lim sup
n→∞
#{u ∈ R : l(u) ≤ n}
#{u ∈ F : l(u) ≤ n}
.
Here l(u) denotes the usual lexicographic length of u as a word in x1, x2, . . . .
Thus, the asymptotic density depends, in general, on a free generating set of F , but
we will not go into these details here because all facts that we are going to need are
independent of the choice of basis. One principal fact that we can use here is due to
Woess [50]: if the group G = F/R is infinite, then ρ
F
(R) = 0. Since the group G
given by the presentation Γ is infinite (see our Section 1.3), this already tells us that
the probability for a random word of length n in x1, x2, . . . not to be equal to 1 in G
is approaching 1 when n→∞. However, if we want words transmitted by Bob to be
of reasonable length (on the order of 100–200, say), we have to address the question
of how fast the ratio in the definition of the asymptotic density converges to 0 if R
is the normal closure of the relators described in the end of Section 1.3. It turns
out that for non-amenable groups the convergence is exponentially fast; this is also
due to Woess [50]. We are not going to explain here what amenable groups are; it
is sufficient for us to know that small cancellation groups are not amenable (because
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they have free subgroups, see e.g. [30]). Thus, small cancellation groups are just fine
for our purposes here: the probability for a random word of length n in x1, x2, . . . not
to be equal to 1 in G is approaching 1 exponentially fast as n ∞.
Finally, we touch upon semantic security (see [16]) of the words transmitted by
Bob. We do not give any rigorous probabilistic estimates since this would require at
least defining a probability measure on an infinite group, which is a very nontrivial
problem by itself (cf. [8]). Instead, we offer here a “hand-waving” type of argument
which we hope to be convincing, at least, to some extent. The nice thing about
Bob’s encryption procedure is that when he selects a word u 6= 1, he simply selects a
random word. Thus, u 6= 1 is indistinguishable from a random word just because it
is random! Then, the element w = [x′i, u], which is transmitted by Bob, looks like it
is no longer random because it is of a special form. However:
1. What is actually transmitted by Bob is a word in the alphabet x1, x2, . . . repre-
senting the element w = [x′i, u] of the group defined by Γ̂. This word is not of
the form [x′i, u] because Bob has applied a “shuffling” to w.
2. Given the specifics of our protocol, what really matters is that transmitted
words equal to 1 in Γ̂ are indistinguishable from transmitted words not equal to
1. This is why we require Bob’s elements representing 1 in Γ̂ to be of the form
[x′i, u] as well.
Thus, the question of semantic security of Bob’s transmissions boils down to the
following question of independent interest: is a word u representing 1 in Γ̂ indis-
tinguishable from a random word (of approximately the same length)? As we have
admitted above, we do not have a rigorous proof that it is, but computer experiments
27
imply that when most of the relators in Γ̂ have length at most 4, then words u rep-
resenting 1 in Γ̂, obtained as described earlier in this section, pass at least the equal
frequency test for 1-, 2-, and 3-letter subwords, thus making it appear likely that the
answer to the question above is affirmative for such Γ̂.
1.6 Suggested Parameters
In this section, we summarize all suggested parameters of our protocol for the reader’s
convenience, although most of these parameters were already discussed in previous
sections.
1. The number of generators xi in Alice’s private presentation Γ is k, a random
integer from the interval 10 ≤ k ≤ 20.
2. The relators r1, . . . , rm in Alice’s private presentation Γ are random in the
x1, . . . , xk. The integer m is random from 1 < m < k − 2, and the lengths
li of ri are also random from 12 ≤ li ≤ 20. There is one other special relator in
Γ, which is obtained as described at the end of Section 1.3.
3. Alice’s private isomorphism (between the presentation Γ and Γ′) is a product, in
random order, of s1 elementary transformations of type (T1) and s2 elementary
transformations of type (T3) (see Section 1.4). Neither of the parameters s1, s2
is specified, but their sum should be in the interval 20 ≤ s1 + s2 ≤ 30+, where
“30+” means that as soon as s1 + s2 becomes equal to 30, only transformations
of type (T1) are applied, targeted at making all relators having length at most
4, as described in Section 1.4.
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4. Bob encrypts his secret bits by words in the given alphabet, as described in
Section 1.5. Here we specify the length of those words. Recall that Bob starts
building a word w = 1 in Γ′ as a product of p words randomly chosen among
published defining relators, their inverses, and their conjugates by one- or two-
letter words in the published generators. We specify p as a random integer
from the interval 5 ≤ p ≤ 12, thus making the whole w a word of length
approximately 150 on average. Computer experiments show that subsequent
“shuffling”, as described in Section 1.5, only slightly increases the length of w.
Finally, we recall that Bob selects a word w 6= 1 in Γ′ in the form [x′i, u], where
u is a random word from the commutator subgroup of the free group generated
by the published generators x′1, x
′
2, . . .. We therefore specify u as a random word
of length l, where l is a random integer from the interval 65 ≤ l ≤ 85. Then
the length of w = [x′i, u] (which is 2l + 2) is going to be approximately 150 on
average, just as in the case of w = 1 considered above.
1.7 Isomorphism Attack
In this section, we discuss a “brute force” attack on the protocol from Section 1.2
and explain why arbitrarily high computational speed alone is insufficient to make
this attack successful.
Knowing the pool of group presentations from which Alice selects her private
presentation Γ, Eve can try to augment the public presentation Γ̂ to a presentation
that would be isomorphic to one from the pool. Theoretically, this is possible because
the pool is recursive and because the set of finite presentations isomorphic to a given
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one is recursive as well. Now let us take a closer look at this recursive procedure.
Eve can add to Γ̂ one element at a time and check whether the resulting presen-
tation, call it Γ̂+, is isomorphic to one of the presentations from Alice’s pool. The
latter is done the following way. Suppose Eve wants to check whether Γ̂+ is isomor-
phic to some Γi. She goes over mappings from Γi to Γ̂+, one at a time, defined on
the generators of Γi. At the same time, she also goes over mappings from Γ̂+ to Γi
defined on the generators of Γ̂+. She composes various pairs of those mappings and
checks whether she gets the identical mapping on Γi. Having the word problem in
Γi solvable makes the latter checking more efficient, but it is, in fact, not necessary
because what matters here is the “yes” part of the word problem, which is always
recursive.
Now let us focus on the part of this procedure where Eve works with a particular
presentation Γi from Alice’s pool. Suppose Γi is not isomorphic to Γ̂+. Since the
“no” part of the isomorphism problem between Γ̂+ and Γi is not recursive, Eve would
have to try out various pairs of mappings between Γ̂+ and Γi (see above) indefinitely.
Therefore, she will have to allocate (indefinitely) some memory resources to checking
this particular Γi. Since the number of Γi grows exponentially with the size of the
presentation (which is the total length of relators), Eve would require essentially
unlimited storage space and, in fact, she will reach physical limits on the storage
space very quickly, e.g., the number of presentations on 6 generators with the total
length of relators bounded by 100 is already more than 10100.
We note that there seems to be no way to bypass these memory size requirements,
even assuming that Eve enjoys arbitrarily high computational speed. She basically
has two options: (1) to run in parallel subroutines corresponding to each Γi, until
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one of the subroutines finds Γi isomorphic to Γ̂+; (2) to enumerate all steps in all
subroutines the same way that one enumerates rational numbers (so that Step i in
the Subroutine j corresponds to the rational number i
j
).
The first option obviously requires unlimited storage space. With the second
option, it may look like just having unlimited computational speed would be sufficient
for Eve. However, since under this arrangement Eve would have to interrupt each
subroutine and then return to it, she would have to at least store the information
indicating where she left off each particular subroutine. Therefore, since the number
of subroutines is unlimited, she would still need unlimited storage space.
1.8 Attack
In this last section for this chapter we discuss an attack that is, in general, more
efficient (especially in real life) than the “brute force” attack described in Section 1.7.
We use here some group-theoretic terminology not supported by formal definitions
when we feel it should not affect the reader’s understanding of the material. Some of
the basic terminology however has to be introduced.
Recall that a group G is called abelian (or commutative) if [a, b] = 1 for any two
elements a, b ∈ G, where [a, b] := a−1b−1ab as described in page 18. This can be
generalized in different ways. A group G is called metabelian if [[x, y], [z, t]] = 1 for
any x, y, z, t ∈ G. A group G is called nilpotent of class c ≥ 1 if [y1, y2, . . . , yc+1] = 1
for any y1, y2, . . . , yc+1 ∈ G, where [y1, y2, y3] = [[y1, y2], y3], etc.
We note that, in the definition of an abelian group, it is sufficient to require
that [xi, xj] = 1 for all generators xi, xj of the group G. Thus, any finitely generated
abelian group is finitely presented. The same is true for all finitely generated nilpotent
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groups of any class c ≥ 1, but not for all metabelian groups. In particular, it is known
that finitely generated free metabelian groups are infinitely presented, cf. [6]. (A free
metabelian group is the factor group F/[[F, F ], [F, F ]] of a free group by the second
commutator subgroup.)
Now we get to quotient attacks. One way for Eve to try to positively identify
those places in Bob’s binary sequence where he intended to transmit a 0 is to use a
quotient test (see e.g. [24] for a general background). That means the following: Eve
tries to add finitely or infinitely many relators to the given presentation Γ̂ to obtain
a presentation defining a group H with solvable word problem (more accurately, a
group H that Eve can recognize as having solvable word problem).
It makes sense for Eve to only try recognizable quotients, such as, for example,
abelian or, more generally, nilpotent ones. This amounts to adding specific relators
to Γ̂; for example, for an abelian quotient, Eve can add relators [x′i, x
′
j] for all pairs
of generators x′i, x
′
j in Γ̂. For nilpotent quotients, Eve will have to add commutators
of higher weight in the generators. For a metabelian quotient, Eve will have to add
infinitely many relators (because, as we have already mentioned, free metabelian
groups are infinitely presented), but this is not a problem since she does not have to
“actually add” those relators; she can just consider Γ̂ as a presentation in the variety
of metabelian groups and apply the relevant algorithm for solving the word problem
which is universal for all groups finitely presented in the variety of metabelian groups.
Note that this trick will not work with hyperbolic quotients, say. This is because
there is no way, in general, to add specific relators (finitely or infinitely many) to Γ̂ to
make sure that the extended presentation defines a hyperbolic group. This deprives
Eve from using a (rather powerful, cf. [24]) hyperbolic quotient attack.
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Classes of groups with solvable word problem are summarized in the survey [25].
It appears that a quotient attack can essentially employ either a nilpotent or a





i, wj] to Γ̂ (see our Section 1.3). This is also the reason why Bob should
choose a word of the form [x′i, u] when he wants to transmit an element not equal
to 1 in Γ′ (see Section 1.5). Indeed, a metabelian quotient attack on an element of
the form [x′i, u] will not work because this element belongs to the second commuta-




i, wj], so x
′
i
belongs to the commutator subgroup of the given group. Furthermore, an element of
the form [x′i, u] belongs to every term of the lower central series of the given group










i, wj], wj], u], etc. This
foils nilpotent quotient attacks as well.
Chapter 2
The membership search problem in
public-key cryptography
The majority of public-key protocols based on non-abelian groups use the computa-
tional hardness of either the conjugacy search problem [1, 26] or the word (search)
problem [7, 15, 48]. In this second chapter we describe a cryptosystem whose security
is based on the following computational hardness:
Definition 2.0.1. Let G be a group, H a subgroup of G generated by {h1, . . . , hk},
and let h ∈ H. The subgroup membership (search) problem is the problem of finding
an expression of h in terms of generators from {h1, . . . , hk}.
It should be mentioned that, in fact, the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld protocol which
may seem to rely on the computational hardness of the conjugacy search problem
alone, actually relies (perhaps somewhat implicitly) on the hardness of the subgroup
membership (search) problem as well, as explained in [43]. We also note that there is
some similarity, at a philosophical level, between our cryptosystem and homomorphic
public-key cryptosystems of [18] and [19]. However, there are also essential differences,
which are explained in Section 2.2.
First we outline the ideas behind our cryptosystem. These ideas can be traced
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back to [34], where a similar approach was used in a commutative situation but it
was not accepted by the cryptographic community as secure [17]. We believe that
employing a non-abelian group instead of a polynomial algebra as the platform does
make a difference in both the efficiency and security components.
2.1 Automorphisms of Relatively-Free Groups
Definition 2.1.1. Let F be a free group and let R be a normal subgroup of F . The
factor group F/R is called relatively free if R is fully invariant, i.e., if α(R) ≤ R for
any endomorphism α of F . If x1, . . . , xn are free generators of F , then x1R, . . . , xnR
are called relatively free generators of F/R.
We are going to denote the relatively free generators of F/R simply by x1, . . . , xn
when there is no ambiguity. Let Fn denote a relatively free group of rank n, i.e.,
Fn = Fn/R for some fully invariant R. Then any map on its generators into Fn can
be extended to an endomorphism of Fn. Because of this property, any relatively free
group Fn can be a candidate platform of our cryptosystem.
Definition 2.1.2. Let X := {x1, . . . , xn} be a set of generators of Fn. A set of
Nielsen automorphisms is a set of automorphisms of Fn engendered by the maps




i if i = j
xi if i 6= j
and βjk : xi
 xixj if i = kxi if i 6= k .
The set of Nielsen automorphisms {αj, βjk | 1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ n } generate the whole
automorphism group of Fn. Similar to free groups, Nielsen automorphisms can be
defined for any relatively free group Fn in the same manner, generating a subgroup
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of the automorphism group Aut (Fn) of Fn called the group of tame automorphisms
of Fn. In some cases, it is equal to the whole Aut (Fn) (see e.g. [4]); in other cases, it
is a proper subgroup of Aut (Fn) (see e.g. [9, 41]). For our purposes, it is important
that free solvable groups of derived length ≥ 3 (see Section 2.3) have many non-tame
automorphisms by [41]:
Theorem 2.1.3 (Shpilrain [41]). Let Fn = Fn/[R,R], and let u ∈ R. If R ≤ γ3(Fn)
and n ≥ 2, then the following αu,j ∈ Aut (Fn) is not tame:
αu,j : xi
 xj[xj, u, xj] if i = jxi if i 6= j .
Moreover, α
−1
u,j : xj xj[xj, u
−1
, xj] for i = j, and α
−1
u,j : xi xi for i 6= j.
Now suppose 〈x1, . . . , xn, xn+1, . . . , xn+m ; R〉 is a presentation for a relatively free
group Fn+m, and let ϕ ∈ Aut (Fn+m) be defined as
ϕ : xi yi , where yi = yi(x1, . . . , xn+m) .
Notice that ϕ acts on the set F n+mn+m , the direct product of n + m copies of Fn+m, in
a natural way:
ϕ : 〈x1, . . . , xn+m〉 〈y1, . . . , yn+m〉 ,
and, more generally, it operates on F n+mn+m as
ϕ : 〈u1, . . . , un+m〉 〈 y1(u1, . . . , un+m), . . . , yn+m(u1, . . . , un+m) 〉
for any ui = ui(x1, . . . , xn+m) ∈ Fn+m. In particular we can restrict the operation
of ϕ on F n+mn+m to an operation ϕ̂ on subgroup of F n+mn+m consisting of elements of the
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form 〈u1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , un(x1, . . . , xn), 1, . . . , 1〉, which is a subgroup isomorphic to
F nn so that
ϕ̂ : 〈u1, . . . , un, 1, . . . , 1〉 〈ŷ1(u1, . . . , un), . . . , ŷn+m(u1, . . . , un)〉
and where ŷi(u1, . . . , un) denotes yi(u1, . . . , un, 1, . . . , 1).
We note that ϕ̂ is a one-to-one map because the restriction of a one-to-one map
to a subgroup is itself one-to-one. This property will be important to us in Section
2.2. At the same time, there is no visible way of recovering ϕ from ϕ̂.
2.2 The protocol
In this section we present our protocol, alluding to the specifics of the group platform
while discussing the specifics for the choice of platform in the following Section 2.3.
Key Generation: Alice generates a public key for Bob to encipher by using the
class of relatively free groups Fn.
1. Alice privately chooses an automorphism ϕ ∈ Aut (Fn+m) as a random
product of tame automorphisms and some easily invertible automorphisms
of the type given in the theorem of Section 2.1, i.e., ϕ = τ1 · · · τk, and she
sets ϕ
−1
as her private-decryption key.
2. Let yi := yi(x1, . . . , xn+m) = ϕ(xi). Alice publishes the collection of words
ŷi(x1, . . . , xn) := yi(x1, . . . , xn, 1, . . . , 1)
as her public-encryption key, where i = 1, ..., n+m.
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Encryption and Decryption Bob’s plaintext is an element w from the subgroup
of Fn+mn+m and of the form
w = 〈 w1, . . . , wn 〉 := 〈w1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , wn(x1, . . . , xn), 1, . . . , 1〉 .
1. Encryption is defined by
w ϕ̂(w) = 〈 ŷ1(w1, . . . , wn), . . . , ŷn+m(w1, . . . , wn) 〉 .
Bob then transmits ϕ̂(w) as a tuple of words in the alphabet X.
2. Decryption is defined by
ϕ̂(w) ϕ−1 ◦ ϕ̂(w) = w (modulo xn+1 = ... = xn+m = 1 ).
This w, or more precisely, a normal form of w (see the end of Section 2.3),
is Alice’s and Bob’s common secret key.
Remark. the encryption of w above is not a homomorphic image (or a preimage) of
w, in contrast to homomorphic public-key cryptosystems of [18] and [19].
Observe that our adversary, Eve, can recover the plaintext w if she finds an ex-
pression for each x1, . . . , xn in terms of ŷ1, . . . , ŷn+m, i.e., if she solves the membership-
search problem for the subgroup generated by ŷ1, . . . , ŷn+m (this subgroup is actually
Fn). Then from
xi = ui(ŷ1(x1, . . . , xn), ..., ŷn(x1, . . . , xn))
she can get
wi = ui(ŷ1(w1, . . . , wn), ..., ŷn(w1, . . . , wn)).
However, if Eve wants to completely break the cryptosystem, i.e., to get the
private decryption key, then she has to find the automorphism ϕ (along with its
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inverse) based on the restriction ϕ̂. This problem looks unapproachable to us by any
deterministic method other than trying out products of “elementary” automorphisms
of Fn+m until the one with the right restriction is found, which is computationally
infeasible for large n and m. We discuss specific values of the parameters of our
cryptosystem in Section 2.4.
We now give a “toy example” just to illustrate how our protocol works. The
example is not platform-specific because here we only use Nielsen automorphisms as
building blocks.
Example 2.2.1. Let n = 2,m = 1, and let βjk be Nielsen automorphisms of F3
defined in the Introduction. Now if Alice chooses ϕ = β223β12β31β32, its action on the
generators is
ϕ : 〈x1, x2, x3〉 〈x3x22, x2x1x3x22, x3x22〉
Then 〈y1, y2, y3〉 = 〈x1x3x22, x2x1x3x22, x3x22〉, and 〈ŷ1, ŷ2, ŷ3〉 = 〈x1x22, x2x1x22, x22〉.
Therefore Bob’s private message (u1(x1, x2), u2(x1, x2)) is encrypted as
〈u1u22, u2u1u22, u22〉 = 〈v1, v2, v3〉 .
However, in this basic example, eve can easily obtain x1 and x2 from the public ŷi’s,
i.e., x1 = ŷ1ŷ3
−1 and x2 = ŷ2ŷ1






As a comment to this example, we note that in a free group, the subgroup mem-
bership search problem can be efficiently solved by Nielsen’s method (see e.g. [30]).
However, adding automorphisms of the type αu,j described in the Theorem from
Section 2.1 makes a difference, since it makes working in a free group pointless.
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We illustrate this fact with the previous example above: if we compose the auto-
morphism ϕ with the map
α : xi
{
x1[x1, [x1, x2], x1] if i = 1
xi if i 6= 1 ,
again, where [u, v] := u−1v−1uv denotes the commutator of u and v. The resulting
automorphism takes the form
〈x1, x2, x3〉 〈y1, y2, y3〉 = 〈x1[x1, [x1, x2], x1]x3x22, x2x1[x1, [x1, x2], x1]x3x22, x3x22〉 ,
where we get 〈ŷ1, ŷ2, ŷ3〉 = 〈x1[x1, [x1, x2], x1]x22, x2x1[x1, x2], x1]x22, x22〉 . Now in the
free group F2, the elements x1 and x2 no longer belong to the subgroup generated
by ŷ1, ŷ2, ŷ3. At the same time, since α is an automorphism of the free metabelian
group F3/F
′′
3 (see the next section), both x1 and x2, considered as elements of F3/F
′′
3 ,
belong to the subgroup of F3/F
′′
3 generated by ŷ1, ŷ2, ŷ3. Therefore, our adversary
Eve will have to solve the subgroup membership-search problem in a free metabelian
group, which is much more difficult than in a free group.
2.3 Free Solvable Groups
In this section we suggest the class of relatively free groups known as free solvable
groups as an implementable pool of group platforms for the protocol described in the
previous section.
Given a group G, the commutator subgroup of G, denoted by G′, is the group
generated by all its commutators. Furthermore, inductively, we can define the kth
term of the derived series of G by setting
G(1) := G′ and G(k+1) := [G(k), G(k)]
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for k ≥ 1. Notice that one has α([u, v]) = [α(u), α(v)] for any endomorphism α of G;
hence, G(k) is a fully invariant subgroup of G for any k ≥ 1.
Definition 2.3.1. Given a the free group Fn of rank n, the free metabelian group of





without loss of generality, the free solvable group of rank n and derived length k,
denoted by S
(k)
n , is the relatively free group Fn/F
(k)
n .
Our choice of a free solvable group for platform is motivated by the following facts:
(1) The word problem in S
(k)
n is solvable in time O(mkn) with respect to the length
m of a given word. Moreover, every element of S
(k)
n has a unique associated “nor-
mal form”, which makes it possible to use our protocol for an efficient encryp-
tion/decryption of actual messages without prior common-key establishment.
(2) S
(k)
n has exponential growth (if k ≥ 2) which provides for an exponential (with
respect to the key size) key space.
(3) Subgroup membership (search) problem in S
(k)
n has no known polynomial-time
solution if k ≥ 2.
Fact (2) is a well-known (cf. [33]), so we leave it without any further comments.
As for (3), there are two different solutions of the membership (decision) problem in
Mn known by now [11, 39], but none of them is “even close” to yielding a polynomial-
time algorithm for solving the membership search problem. No algorithm is known
for solving the membership (decision) problem in S
(k)
n for k ≥ 3. We give more details
in Section 2.4; here we concentrate on the word problem in Mn.
It is also interesting to note that free solvable groups S
(k)
n are infinitely presented
if k ≥ 2 (see e.g. [6]), i.e., they cannot be defined by finitely many relations, in
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contrast with groups typically used in public-key cryptography. Nevertheless, as we
shall see in this section, these groups have efficient (and, in fact, very easy) solvable
word problem. In order to demonstrate this statement we introduce Fox derivatives,
which are noncommutative analogs of usual Leibniz derivatives.
Definition 2.3.2. Let ZF be the group ring of a free group F generated by the set
{x1, x2, ...}. A Fox derivative1 with respect to xi is a map ∂xi : F ZF such that
for any v, w ∈ F satisfies ∂xi(vw) = ∂xi(v) + v∂xi(w) and ∂xi(xj) = δij , where δij
denotes the Kronecker delta.
Example 2.3.1. Let g ∈ F and let 1 be the identity of F . Since ∂(1) = ∂(1) + ∂(1),
it follows that ∂(1) = 0. Therefore ∂(gg
−1
) = ∂(g) + g∂(g
−1














−1) + x−1y−1∂x(x) + x
−1y−1x∂x(y)
)
= −x−1 + x−1y−1 .
Now let Fab denote the abelianization of a free group F , i.e., the factor group
F/F ′, and let α : F Fab be the natural epimorphism—while noting that it can
be extended to the group ring as α : ZF ZFab by linearity.
Proposition 2.3.3. Let w ∈ Fn. Then w ∈ F ′′n if and only if α(∂xi(w)) = 0 for each
generator xi of Fn.
For a proof of proposition 2.3.3 see [21]. This Proposition allows us to determine
a simple algorithm for solving the word problem in a free metabelian group Mn. In
1Fox derivatives extended to the entire groupring ZF by linearity.
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other word, given w ∈ Mn, as a word in relatively free generators xi, one considers
w as an element of the free group Fn with the same set of free generators, computes
∂xi(w) for each xi, and checks whether or not all of them abelianize to 0. The latter is
straightforward since the word problem in the free abelian group Fab is easily solvable.
This algorithm is not only simple but efficient as well:
Theorem 2.3.4. The algorithm for solving the word problem in Mn based on Propo-
sition 2.3.3 has at most quadratic time complexity with respect to the length of the
input word.
Proof. Let w ∈ Fn and let |w| = m denote the usual lexicographic length of the word
w. The computation of ∂xi(w), for any generator xi, produces at most m summands
in the free group ring ZFn. Thus, the computation of ∂x has at most linear time
complexity with respect to m. Then, deciding whether or not the abelianization of
∂xi(w) is 0 amounts to collecting summands of the form c · hi, c ∈ Z, hi ∈ Fn, such
that all hi have the same abelianization. This is achieved by rewriting every hi in
the form xa11 x
a2
2 · ... · xann · ui, where ui ∈ F ′n. Since any hi has length ≤ m and the
number of hi is at most m, this part of the algorithm takes time O(m
2), completing
the proof. 2
We also note that to any element w of the free metabelian group Mn, one can
associate a unique “normal form”, which is a vector of n abelianized partial Fox
derivatives of the word w considered an element of the free group Fn. By Proposition
2.3.3, two vectors corresponding to two elements w1, w2 ∈ Mn are equal if and only
if w1 = w2 in Mn. The presence of a unique normal form makes it possible for Alice
and Bob to make the exchange of information more efficient than it would be if it
was based simply on the solvability of the word problem. (In the later case, if Alice
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and Bob have arrived at a point where Alice has an element, say, u, and Bob has
an element v such that u = v in the platform group G, they can communicate as
follows. Bob chooses, privately, a finite binary sequence b1, b2, ..., which is going to be
his secret message to Alice. He then transmits a sequence of group elements u1, u2, ...
such that ui = v in G if and only if bi = 1. Alice recovers the sequence b1, b2, ... by
comparing u1, u2, ... to her u.)
To conclude this section, we mention that the word problem in any free solvable
group of derived length k can be solved along the same lines, but the complexity
would depend on k; namely, it would have time complexity O(mk).
2.4 Cryptanalysis
There are two visible ways to attack our cryptosystem: (1) trying to find the auto-
morphism ϕ (and its inverse) based on the restriction ϕ̂ and (2) trying to solve the
subgroup membership (search) problem in the platform group. As we have already
pointed out in Section 2.2, the first way looks intractable to us, so we focus on the
subgroup membership problem here, but first we make a relevant remark about the
word problem.
In the previous section, we obtained the solvability of the word problem in free
metabelian groups Mn by using Fox derivatives. We indicate that the solvability of
the word problem in Mn can also be obtained by a much less efficient but nevertheless
interesting method, using the fact that Mn are residually finite groups [23].
Definition 2.4.1. A group G is said to be residually finite if for every g ∈ G− {1}
there exists a finite group Hg and a homomorphism ϕ : G Hg such that ϕ(g) 6= 1.
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If a group G = F/R is residually finite, then it has the word problem solvable
as follows. Given g ∈ G as a word in the generators of F , two algorithms run
in parallel. One of them goes over all finite homomorphic images of G (those are
recursively enumerable) and checks whether ϕ(g) 6= 1 in any of them (note that the
word problem is solvable in any finite group). Thus, if g 6= 1 in G, this algorithm will
eventually detect that. The other algorithm just recursively enumerates all elements
of R and compares them to g one at a time. Thus, if g = 1 in G, this algorithm will
eventually detect it.
This way of solving the word problem is “cute”, but it is obviously useless in
applications, albeit, we mentioned because there is a similar (equally useless) way of
solving the membership problem in a special class of groups.
Definition 2.4.2. A group G is said to be locally extended residually finite (LERF)
if for every subgroup K ∈ G and g ∈ G − K, there exists a finite group H and a
homomorphism ϕ : G H such that ϕ(g) ∈ ϕ(G)− ϕ(K).
Coulbois showed that free metabelian groups are LERF (cf. [11].) If a group G
is LERF, it follows that G has solvable subgroup membership (decision) problem by
way of an algorithm similar to what was described above. However, this algorithm is
anything but practical, as well as the algorithm for solving the word problem based
on residual finiteness of a given group.
An alternative algorithm for solving the subgroup membership (both decision
and search) problem in Mn was offered in [39], which is somewhat more “down-to-
earth”. However it is still far from being practical because it involves, among other
things, computing a Gröbner basis of an ideal of the ring of Laurent polynomials in
n variables.
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In the absence of feasible deterministic attacks, one might try heuristic (“length
based”) attacks in the spirit of [14]. We point out, however, that groups that were
typically used as proving ground for “length based” attacks are very different in nature
from free solvable groups; the length function for free solvable groups is, informally
speaking, much less predictable than it is, say, for braid groups, which probably means
that “length based” attacks are going to be less successful.
2.5 Suggested Parameters
We culminate this chapter by specifying the parameters of our cryptosystem. First,
we suggest the class of free metabelian group as the choice a platform group, albeit,
there is an approach to solving the subgroup membership problem in such a group
mentioned above. We believe that this approach has only a theoretical advantage over
the exhaustive search, and, therefore, it is not a threat to the security of the cryp-
tosystem. Another property of free metabelian groups that distinguishes them from
other free solvable groups is that they only have tame automorphisms [4]. However,
automorphisms described in the Theorem in Section 2.1, although tame in the case
of a free metabelian group, are tame in a very nontrivial (“nonmonotonic”) way, i.e.,
to factor them into a product of Nielsen automorphisms one has to first increase the
length of α(xi) before it could be decreased. This is supposed to foil “length based”
attacks on ϕ.
Thus, in the interests of efficiency, we suggest to use a free metabelian group
of a fairly small rank as platform, where the rank satisfies r = n + m = 10 for
n = 8, m = 2.
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An important parameter is the number of “elementary” automorphisms in the
factorization ϕ = τ1 · · · τk of the key automorphism ϕ. One has to be careful here
because, say, the automorphism group of a free group has exponential growth with
respect to the (finite) generating set that consists of all Nielsen automorphisms. This
implies, in particular, that the length of ϕ(xi) grows exponentially with k. However,
in the free group of rank r = 10 the base of this exponent is so small (the higher the
rank the smaller the base) that, according to our experiments, for a random product
of 30 Nielsen automorphisms the average length of ϕ(xi) is under 30, which is quite
reasonable.
For these reasons we suggest k = 30, of which 90% should be random Nielsen au-
tomorphisms and 10% automorphisms of the type described in Theorem from Section
2.1. That means, when building the automorphism ϕ as a product of “elementary”
automorphisms one factor at a time, Alice selects, at each step, a Nielsen automor-
phism with probability 90% and an automorphism of type αu,j with probability 10%.
This provides for sufficiently large key space because there are approximately 100
Nielsen automorphisms in the free (or relatively free) group of rank 10, so products of
30 Nielsen automorphisms already give us approximately 10030 = 1060 choices for ϕ.
On top of that, there are automorphisms αu,j with arbitrary u ∈ [Fr, Fr]. The length
of u has to be bounded by, say, 10, to keep the complexity of ϕ within reasonable
limits. This leaves us with the pool of approximately 107 elements to choose u from.
With these parameters at hand the average total length of ϕ(xi) is under 1000,
where i ∈ {1, ..., 10}, according to our experiments.
Chapter 3
Rewriting with Transversals
In this chapter describe a method of rewriting elements in a group that will be essential
to Chapter 4. We accomplish this aim by capitalizing from the canonical action a
group G has on itself, as an auxiliary operation of G, to develop the theory we
call diffracted groups : a pseudo-vector decomposition of G in terms of a choice of
elements from the cartesian product T × H, in the category Set, where T will be a
transversal of G of a subgroup H of G. In return the diffracted decomposition T ×H
bequeaths an isomorphic block decomposition of G, which makes it a group per se.
The decomposition T × H of G will allow for an explicit description of a rewriting
procedure for the product of its ordered pairs.
In the following section we show how the product of a group G decomposes into
another auxiliary operation for G, with the basic concept of representations, that
will be used in Section 3.5 to describe the rewriting, group-product operation for the
decomposition T ×H of G.
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3.1 The Cayley Representation
In order to formally accomplish our intention we begin by denoting Set and Grp as
the category of sets and groups, respectively, and we set Sym : Set Grp to be the






for any objects X, Y ∈ Set and any map ψ : X Y , where SX denotes the
symmetric group of X.
Definition 3.1.1. Given a group G, the category G|Sym of permutation representa-
tions of G is the category consisting of the following objects and morphisms:
• Objects in G|Sym are pairs 〈X,ϕ〉 such that ϕ is in the exponential HomGrp(G, SX)
equipped with evaluation





where X ∈ Set, and 〈g, ϕ〉 are generalized constants from 〈X,ϕ〉. We refer to objects
from G|Sym as representations.
• Morphisms in G|Sym are arrows 〈X,ϕ1 〉 〈Y, ϕ2 〉
ψ∗
where ψ∗ is a group homo-
morphism ψ∗ : G
ϕ1 Gϕ2 associated to a map ψ from Hom Set(X, Y ) such that






: ψ(x) gϕ2 ◦ ψ(x)
]
ii. ∀ g ∈G ∀ x ∈X
[
gϕ2 ◦ ψ(x) = ψ ◦ gϕ1 (x)
]
i.e., ψ∗ ◦ ϕ1 = ϕ2 and ψ ◦ gϕ1 = gϕ2 ◦ ψ is satisfied in Grp and Set, respectively.
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Any group can be viewed as “operating” on itself by means of permutations
through its fundamental operation: by considering the product operation in a group
G, we can permute any element h in G simply by multiplying it by another element
g in G. In this case, we only have to choose whether to multiply the element g to the
right of h or to the left of h. Once we have made this choice we can describe it in the
category G|Sym of permutation representations of G:
Definition 3.1.2. The (left) regular representation of a group G is the assignment




g % : h gh
) ]
. (3.1.1)
This apparently simple assignment stores enough information to make % an injec-
tive permutation representation of G into the symmetric group S
G
.
Definition 3.1.3. Given G ∈ Grp, the category G-Set of group actions of G on Set
consists of the following objects and morphisms:
• Objects in G-Set are pairs 〈ρ,X 〉, where X ∈ Set and ρ ∈ HomSet(G × X,X)
satisfies
i . ∀ x ∈X
[
ρ(1, x) = x
]
ii . ∀ g1 , g2 ∈G ∀ x ∈X
[
ρ( g1 g2 , x ) = ρ
(
g1 , ρ(g2 , x)
) ]
We refer to objects in G-Set as left actions of G.
• Morphisms in G-Set are arrows ψ : 〈ρ1 , X 〉 〈ρ2 , Y 〉 such that ψ ∈ HomSet(X, Y )








A morphisms ψ is referred as a G-Set homomorphism, and ψ is referred as a G-Set
isomorphism if ψ is also bijective. (By symmetry we can also define a category G-Set
whose objects are right actions of G.)
In particular there is an isomorphic adjunction G-Set ∼= G|Sym making any rep-
resentation ϕ : G SX envision its associated action ρ : Gy X via ϕ, i.e.,
∀ g ∈G
[
ρ : 〈g, x〉 gx := gϕ(x)
]
.
where, by convention, gx := ρ(g, x) indicates ρ acts on the left of X.
The case of Cayley’s representation % shows us a glimpse into the decomposition











where the symbols “•” and 1lG denote the product operation and the identity auto-
morphism of G, respectively. We can think of diagram 3.1.2 as living in the category
of sets, since everything involved in its concoction occurs in the underlying set of G.
In this scenario, albeit, the bottom left-side part of the diagram G×G is interpreted
as a set, the diagram’s commutativity infers that the induced set S
G
× G can be
thought as an auxiliary decomposition of the product of G from which the action %̂
mimics the product of elements in G.
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3.2 The Frobenius Representation
The group G acts on itself via the symmetric group S
G
, by way of Cayley’s repre-
sentation, in a regular way—from the left by multiplication—and offers an intuitive
way of describing a structural decomposition of G by codifying it with respect to a
subgroup H and its cosets.
Definition 3.2.1. Let G be a group, H ≤ G and G/H the set of left cosets of of the
subgroup H. Given the exponential
Λ := { τ : G/H
⋃
g ∈ G
gH | ∀ g ∈ G [ τ(gH) ∈ gH ] } , (3.2.1)
of G/H with its self, a set of (left ) representatives T of G/H is the image of a
coordinate τ ∈ Λ, i.e., T := Im τ . Moreover a set of representatives T is a (left)
transversal of G/H whenever the identity element 1 in G is also in T . (If we consider
the set commutes of right cosets H\G we can also define a set of right representatives
R of H\G.)
The existence of a set of representatives T emanates from a map τ ∈ Λ, where a
“choice” determines a single element from each coset of G/H. Thus, each coordinate
point τ ∈ Λ contains a codification of G, modulo H. Given τ and the canonical












commutes for any g ∈ G. In particular τ̄ : G T is a systematic map of G onto
the representative set T .
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Definition 3.2.2. Let p : G −→ G/H be natural and τ ∈ Λ. Given a set of
representatives T of G/N , a representative map is the map
τ : G T such that ∀ g ∈G
[
g g := τ( gH )τ̄
]
.
Moreover any element of the form g in T is termed a representative of g.
Notice that a representative element ḡ ∈ T of g in G depends only on the chosen
system of representatives T of G/H.
Lemma 3.2.3. If T is a set of representatives of G/H of G, then
i . ∀ g ∈G
[
g H = g H
]
ii . ∀ g1, g2 ∈G
[
g1g2 = g1 g2
]
Proof : Let T be a set of representative of G/H and τ a map of its representatives.
i. Given g ∈ G, then gH = ḡ H since its representative ḡ satisfies
g ∈ ḡ H ⇐⇒ ∃ ! h ∈H [ ḡ = g h−1 ] ⇐⇒ ḡ ∈ gH .
ii. By the above argument g2H = g2H for any g2 ∈ G. Then g1 g2H = g1 g2H
for any g1 ∈ G. Therefore g1 g2 = g1g2 since τ is well defined. 2
Definition 3.2.4. Given a set of representatives T of G/H, the Frobenius represen-
tation is the assignment
γ : G ST definied as ∀ g ∈G ∀ t ∈T
[
g 7−→ ( gγ : t 7−→ g t )
]
. (3.2.2)
Proposition 3.2.5. The Frobenius representation for a set of representatives T of
G/H is a permutation representation.
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Proof : Let T set of representatives of G/H. If t ∈ T , then γ : 1 1γ satisfies
1γ (t) = 1t = t = t by definition, i.e., 1γ = 1 in SymT . Also, letting g1, g2 ∈ G,
( g1 g2 )
γ (t) = g1 g2 t = g1 g2 t = g1 g
γ




2 ( t ) .
Therefore ( g1 g2 )
γ = gγ1 ◦ g
γ
2 ; hence γ is a permutation representation. 2
3.3 Diffractions and T -Fibrations
A set of representatives T of G/H is not a subgroup of G, in general; however, with
the Frobenius representation we can begin to directly partition G into Set-isomorphic
cells of elements from its representative set T and subgroup H.
Proposition 3.3.1. If T be a set of representatives of G/H and
∇ : G T ×H is defined by ∇ : g 〈t, h〉 (3.3.1)
for any g ∈ G such that g = th, where 〈t, h〉 ∈ T ×H, then ∇ is a Set isomorphism
and g can be uniquely decomposed as g = th.








{ t } ×H = T ×H
Therefore for any g ∈ G there is a unique t ∈ T such that g ∈ tH. Moreover, if
g = t h and t h = t h′ for h, h′ ∈ H, then h′ = h, i.e., ∇ : g 〈t, h〉 is a
well-defined bijection. 2
Definition 3.3.2. Given a set of representatives T of G/H, the diffractor of G by
T is the Set-isomorphism ∇ : G T × H, described in proposition 3.3.1. We
refer to its image T × H as the diffraction of G by T , and we refer to an element
〈t, h〉 ∈ T ×H as the spectrum of g by T .
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If we think of the above process metaphorically, then any element g from its source
G can be seen with a prism T as having a unique spectrum 〈t, h〉 from its diffraction
T ×H. In essence ∇ “diffracts” the group G into the set T ×H.
Our goal is to diffract G as the Set product T ×H with an effective procedure for
any of its elements. Therefore, in order to do achieve this objective, we consider the
actions Gy T we have determined from our representations:
From the Frobenius representation γ : G ST we get its associated group action
γ̂ : G× T T
γ : G ST
described as ∀ 〈g,t〉 ∈G×T
[
γ̂ : 〈g, t〉 gγ(t) = gt
]
In particular the set of representatives T is invariant under G y T modulo γ, by
definition. Now consider G y T modulo cayley’s representation %, and rewrite its
action as
%̂ : 〈g, t〉 gt ( gt )
-1
gt := gt (3.3.2)
given any of g ∈ G and t ∈ T . On the right side of equation (3.3.2) we have rewritten
the effect of Cayley’s action over 〈g, t〉 using Frobenius representation γ. Notice
gt ∈ T by definition, and ( gt )
-1
gt ∈ H, because for any t ∈ T and g ∈ G
1 = ( g t )
-1
( g t ) = ( g t )
-1
g t =⇒ H = 1H = ( g t )
-1
g tH = ( gt )
-1
gt H ,
which follows from lemma 3.2.3. And, by proposition 3.3.1, Cayley’s action of g on
t can be uniquely express as the product of gt ∈ T and ( gt )
-1
gt ∈ H. In particular
gt 6∈ T if and only if gt 6= gt, which verifies the obvious fact that T is not invariant
under cayley’s action. But, most important, equation (3.3.2) allows also us to rewrite
the effect of the diffractor with Cayley’s action restricted to the set T as follows:
∇◦ %̂ 
T
: G×T T ×H such that ∀ 〈g,t〉 ∈G×T
[






Definition 3.3.3. A T -fibration of G, for a representative T of G/H, is the map
δ : G× T H defined by ∀ 〈g,t〉 ∈G×T
[





A T -fibration δ is well defined by construction, and it allows for an effective
description of the diffraction ∇(G) = T ×H, as follows:
Theorem 3.3.4. If T is a transversal of G/H and δ : G× T H its T -fibration,
then the diffractor ∇ : G T ×H is uniquely decomposable into the pair
∇ = 〈 τ̄ , δo 〉 such that ∀ g ∈G
[





where δo is δ( , 1) : G H and τ̄ is the representative map (cf. definition 3.2.2).
Proof : Let δ : G × T H be the T -fibration of G/H and let ∇ : G T × H
be the diffractor of G by T . If T is a transversal, 1 ∈ T and Cayley’s action of any
g ∈ G on the identity is just %̂(g, 1) = g. Then
∇(g) = ∇ ◦ %̂ (g, 1) = 〈ḡ, ( g )
-1
g〉 = 〈 τ̄(g), δ(g, 1) 〉 = 〈τ̄ , δo〉 (g) ,
where δo is δ( , 1) : G H. Now given the projection maps pH : T ×H H and
p
T
: T ×H T , the pair 〈 τ̄ , δo〉 satisfies the commutative diagram
G
T T ×H H .
τ̄ δo
pT pH
〈 τ̄ , δo〉
Therefore ∇ is uniquely decomposable into the pair 〈 τ̄ , δo〉 by uniqueness of the
universal property of direct products. 2
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3.4 The Diffracted Representation
To explicitly construct a group product in the set T × H, we mimic the auxiliary
product determined by the Cayley representation of G into S
G
, cf. diagram (3.1.2).
In this section we gather tools from the previous section to describe an isomorphic
representation of Cayley’s representation of G into S
T×H , the symmetric group of
T × H; then, in the following section, this representation will enable us to describe
the product of G as a product in its canonical set T ×H for a transversal T of G/H
from the standard set-theoretic isomorphism between the elements of G and T ×H.
We do this by first examining the set of maps Hom Set(T,H).
To be more precisely, given a concrete category C and any two objects A,B ∈ C,
recall the exponential of A by B is the set BA := HomC(A,B), which denotes the
collection of morphisms from A to B. For a set of representatives T of G/H, the
exponential explicitly takes the form
H T = { f : T H }
and is a set that becomes a group under point-wise multiplication, e.g.,
∀ f1, f2 ∈H T
[
f1 · f2 := { 〈 t , f1(t) f2(t) 〉 | t ∈ T } ] . (3.4.1)
Now the natural isomorphism Hom set (G × T,H ) ∼= Hom set (G,H T ) describes the
dual δ̃ : G H T of a T -fibration δ : G× T H as follows:
δ̃ : G H T
δ : G× T H




δg : t δ(g, t)
) ]
,
where δg denotes the map δ(g, ) : T H.
Lemma 3.4.1. A T -fibration δ, for a set of representatives T of G/H, satisfies
∀ t ∈T ∀ g1, g2 ∈G
[
















δ(g2, t) = ( g1 g2 t )
-1
g1 g2 t ( g2 t )
-1
g2 t = ( g1 g2 t )
-1
g1 g2 t = δ(g1 g2 , t)
for any g1, g2 ∈ G since gt := gγ(t). 2
Observe that the dual map δ̃ : G H T of the T -fibration is in Set and it does
not extend to a homomorphism, by lemma 3.4.1 above, since
δg1 g2(t) := δ(g1 g2 , t) 6= δ( g1, t ) δ( g2, t ) =: δ g1 (t) δ g2 (t) .
However, letting δ̃(G) := { δg | g ∈ G } denote the image of dual δ̃ : G H T , the
set δ̃(G) becomes a group.
Lemma 3.4.2. Given the dual δ̃ of a T -fibration δ, its image δ̃(G) becomes a group
with identity element δ1 under point-wise multiplication .
Proof. The set δ̃(G) = { δg | g ∈ G } is clearly a group under formulation (3.4.1).
Moreover, given the identity 1 ∈ G, the identity of δ̃(G) is δ1 since




(t) = δ(1, t) δ(g, t) = δg(t)
for any δg ∈ δ̃(G) and t ∈ T . 2
The group structure of the image δ̃(G) of the dual of δ acts on the diffraction
T ×H, i.e., any element f ∈ H T can act as a permutation on T ×H as
∀ 〈t,h〉 ∈T×H
[
f : 〈t, h〉 〈 t, f(t)h 〉
]
. (3.4.2)
Lemma 3.4.3. Given the group structure δ̃(G) of the image of the dual δ̃ of a T -
fibration δ, the assignment β : δ̃(G) ST×H defined as





ββ : 〈t, h〉 〈t, δg(t)h 〉
) ]
(3.4.3)
is an injective permutation representation of δ̃(G) into S
T×H .
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Proof. The assignment β : δ̃(G) S
T×H is a well-defined map by way of δ. Now
a priori (δ1 )









( t, δg2 (t)h ) =
(
δg1
)β◦ (δg2 )β (t, h)
for any g1 , g2 ∈ G. To see that β is injective let δg ∈ Ker β. Then
(δg )
β(t, h) = 〈t, h〉 = 〈t, δg (t)h〉 . (3.4.4)
Equation (3.4.4) above is satisfiable if and only if δg (t) = 1, i.e., g = 1. Therefore β
is an injective permutation representation of δ̃(G) into S
T×H . 2
From lemma 3.4.3 it follows that the group structure of δ̃(G), the dual δ̃ of a
T -fibration δ, can act on the diffraction T ×H. This result, along with the assistance
of the Frobenius representation and the dual δ̃ of δ, grants us an extension of the
Frobenious representation to a permutation representation of G into S
T×H .
Definition 3.4.4. The diffracted representation of G by a set of representatives T of
G/H is the assignment α : G S
T×H defined by






) ◦ (δg)βα : 〈t, h〉 〈 gγ(t) , δg(t)h 〉
) ]
,
where β is the permutation representation described in the previous lemma 3.4.3.
Theorem 3.4.5. The diffracted representation α : G S
T×H is an injective per-
mutation representation of G into S
T×H .
Proof : Let g ∈ G and 〈t, h〉 ∈ T ×H. Then (gγ × 1l
H
) ∈ S
T×H since it acts as




which is permutation induced by the Frobenius representation γ. From lemma 3.4.3
δg ∈ δ̃(G) acts on the diffraction T × H as (δg)β : 〈t, h〉 〈 t, δ(t, g)h〉 . Thus
(gγ × 1l
H
) ◦ (δg)β ∈ ST×H is a permutation on the set T ×H described as
(gγ × 1l
H
) ◦ (δg)β : 〈t, h〉 〈 gγ(t) , δg(t)h 〉 .
Now the action of the identity 1 ∈ G induced by α on 〈h, t〉 is given as
α(1) 〈t, h〉 := (1γ × 1l
H
) ◦ (δg)β 〈t, h〉 = 〈 1γ(t) , δ1(t)h 〉 = 〈 t , ( t )
-1
t h 〉 = 〈t, h〉
since t̄ = t. Therefore α(1) = 1 in S
T×H . Moreover, given g1 , g2 ∈ G, the action of
g2 followed by the action of g1 on 〈t, h〉 by way of α is





























(t) , δ(g2 , t)h 〉




(t) , δ(g1 , g
γ
2





(t) = ( g1 g2 )







δ(g2, t) = δ(g1 g2 , t) := δ g1 g2 (t) ,
which follows by the Frobenius representation γ and lemma 3.4.1, respectively. There-
fore, putting these two facts together, we get






◦ (δ g1 g2)β 〈t, h〉
= α( g1 g2 ) 〈t, h〉 ,
i.e., α( g1 g2 ) = α(g1) ◦ α(g2) . Hence α is a representation of G into S T×H . Last, α
is injective if 〈 gγ(t) , δg(t)h 〉 = 〈t, h〉 , i.e., gt = t and δg (t) = 1 if and only if g = 1.
Thus α is injective as well. 2
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3.5 The Diffracted Group
In this section we use the bijection of the diffractor ∇ : G T×H and the difracted
representation α : G S
T×H to the describe the group structure for the difracted
set of G, i.e, the cartesian set T ×H, for a transversal set T of G/H. Moreover, given
the group structure of T ×H, we also show that ∇ is a group isomorphism as well.
We do this by applying the following G-Set isomorphism:
Theorem 3.5.1. The diffractor ∇ : G T ×H for a transversal T of G/H is a G-
Set isomorphism between the actions induced by Cayley’s representation % : G T
and the diffracted representation α : G T ×H .
Proof : Let %̂ : G× T T and α̂ : G× (T ×H) T ×H be the action induce
by Cayley’s representation % of G and the diffracted representation α of G by T ,








〈g, k 〉 gt ( g t )
-1
g t h







for any g, k ∈ G where k = t h and 〈t, h〉 ∈ T ×H, i.e., ∇ is a G-Set isomorphism. 2
Theorem 3.5, above, not only stipulates that G and T ×H are G-Set isomorphic,
as sets, but that the diffracted representation α expresses the Cayley representation
when G is diffracted as T × H as a set. Fortunately, this relationship is more than
happenstance: the diffraction T×H of G borrows the group structure of G through α,
since Cayley’s representation manifests the product structure of G. As consequence,
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similar to the commutativity of diagram (3.1.2), the product “•” in G splits as
G×G G





Theorem 3.5.2. If δ is the T -fibration associated to Frobenius representation γ for
a transversal T of G/H, then T ×H becomes a group under the operation defined as
∀ 〈t1,h1〉, 〈t2,h2〉 ∈T×H
[
〈t1, h1〉·〈t2, h2〉 := 〈 tγ1◦ h
γ
1 (t2) , δ(t1h1, t2)h2 〉
]
(3.5.2)
Proof. Given the diffractor ∇ : G T × H of G with respect to a transversal T
and the diffracted representation α : G T × H of G by T , by diagram (3.5.1)
the following diagram commutes as well:
G×G G
(T ×H)2 T ×H






(∇−1 )× 1l 1l
“ · ”
Moreover, the central dashed arrow describes the product in T ×H induced by G as
〈




1 (t2) , δ(t1h1, t2)h2 〉
·
for any 〈t1, h1〉, 〈t2, h2〉 ∈ T ×H. Therefore, since G is a group, T ×H is a group. 2
This theorem also allows the Frobenius representation γ and its T -fibration δ to
interpret the product of any two elements g1, g2 ∈ G of the form g1 = t1h1 and





1 (t2) δ(t1h1, t2)h2 = t1h1t2 δ(t1h1, t2)h2 ,
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where t1h1t2 ∈ T and δ(t1h1, t2)h2 ∈ H. Hence, allowing the product of elements in
a group G to be rewritten in terms of a transversal T and its associated subgroup H.
Definition 3.5.3. Given a transversal T of G/H for a group G, the (internal)
diffracted group of G by T , denoted by T ·H , is the group structure on T × H
inherited from formulation (3.5.2).
Theorem 3.5.4. The diffractor ∇ : G T ·H of a transversal T of G/H is a
group isomorphism.
Proof : Given the identity 1 ∈ G, then ∇(1) = 〈1, 1〉. Now let g1, g2 be elements
in G such that each has a unique decomposition g1 = t1 h1 and g2 = t2 h2 , where
t1, t2 ∈ T and h1, h2 ∈ H. Then ∇ is an epimorphism since
∇(g1 g2) = 〈 t1h1 t2h2 , δ(t1h1 t2h2, 1) 〉 = 〈 t1h1 t2h2 , δ(t1h1, t2h2) δ(t2h2, 1) 〉
= 〈 t γ1 ◦ h
γ
1 (t2) , δ(t1h1, t2)h2 〉
= 〈t1, h1〉·〈t2, h2〉
= ∇(g1)·∇(g2) .
Moreover ∇ is an isomorphism since any g ∈ Ker∇ must satisfy g = 1. 2
Chapter 4
Using Transversals in Public-key
Cryptography
In this last Chapter we present a key-exchange protocol based on the idea of Kahrobaei
and Shpilrain [12]. In their description, Kahrobaei and Shpilrain implement the
semidirect product G = K n H, where K is a subgroup of G and H is normal in
G. In our description we replace K nH with a set T ×H, where T is a transversal
of a group G of a subgroup H of G, which we described in the Chapter 3. Despite
differences between our protocols, the two systems agree on a main advantage factor:
both do not transmit all of the information but rather part of it.
Our protocol also utilizes parts of the standard Diffie-Hellman cryptographic pro-
tocol, similar to [12]. Ordinarily the Diffie-Hellman protocol uses the cyclic group
Cn, the multiplicative group of integers modulo some natural number n, as follows:
1. Alice and Bob agree on a cyclic group Cn and a generating element g in Cn.
2. Alice picks a random natural number a and sends ga to Bob.
3. Bob picks a random natural number b and sends gb to Alice.
4. Alice and Bob compute KA = (g
b)a = gba and KB = (g
a)b = gab, respectively.
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Here Alice and Bob end up with the same element K = KA = KB since ab = ba,
which stands as the shared secret key. Notice that an eavesdropper Eve has to solve
the Diffie-Hellman problem to recover the shared secret key, i.e., Eve must recover
gab from g, ga and gb to obtain K. This is currently considered a hard problem for
an “ideal” choice of parameters (cf. [32] for details).
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol initiated the modern field of public-key
cryptography and asymmetric encryption methods in the seminal paper [13]. At the
present time the Diffie-Hellman protocol—along with other key-exchange algorithms
and asymmetric encryption—has become centrally ingrained in the cryptographic
community because of its simplicity, clarity, and practical security that alludes its
elegance, as a fundamental tool for exchanging sensitive data over the electronic
channels. However, with the rise of post-quantum cryptography, algorithmic prob-
lems such as the Diffie-Hellman problem, can potentially be solved with an adequate
quantum computer.
As we mentioned in the intructory chapter, quantum computers with approxi-
mately 512 qubits are claimed to be available now to companies like Google, Lockheed
Martin and government agencies, see e.g. [47]. For these reasons there is a strong
interest in designing a Post-Quantum Key Exchange protocol that could be resilient
against quantum computers. One particular road paving way towards this ambition
focuses on the search for platforms where the security of the Diffie-Hellman protocol
would have different premises, or where a similar algorithm could be implemented
with greater efficiently.
In search for these new cryptographic primitives, post-quantum cryptography has
given rise to a number of alternatives. These include the development of finite field
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based cryptography; elliptic curve based cryptography; lattice based cryptography;
and, in our context, the nascent development of primitives based on non-commutative
groups (see e.g. [49] and [35],) which has been the subject of this thesis.
4.1 Mimicking the Kahrobaei-Shpilrain Protocol
The Kahrobaei and Shpilrain protocols [12] and [22] rely on the idea of semidirect
products, or more generally, on extension of (semi)groups by endomorphisms.
Definition 4.1.1. Let G and H be groups, and let ρ : H AutG be a homomor-
phism from H into the automorphism group of G. Then the semidirect product of G
by H is the set Γ = Goρ H = {〈g, h〉 : g ∈ G, h ∈ H} with the product given by
∀ n ∈N
[




′) denotes the image of g under the automorphism ρ(h′).
To explain our protocol we first describe the Kahrobaei-Shpilrain protocol, which
resembles the classical Diffie-Hellman procedure; however, there are several distinctive
features that give their new protocol a theoretical advantage that can potentially serve
in practical implementations. For example, as we alluded in the introduction of this
chapter, even though Alice and Bob compute a large power of a public element of
the group, they transmit only part of the element. More specifically, verbatim, their
protocol is described as follows:
A (semi)group G and an element g ∈ G is chosen and made public, as well as
an arbitrary endomorphism φ ∈ EndG. Both Alice and Bob are going to compute
elements of the form 〈g, φr 〉, where 〈g, φr 〉 · 〈h, φs〉 = 〈φs(g) · h, φr+s〉 describes the
product for g, h ∈ G and r, s ∈ N. Then,
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1. Alice computes 〈g, φ〉m = 〈φm−1(g) · · ·φ2(g) · φ(g) · g, φm 〉 for an m ∈ N she
privately chooses. She then sends only the first component to Bob. Thus,
she sends Bob only a = φm−1(g) · · ·φ2(g) · φ(g) · g of the (semi)group G.
2. Bob computes 〈g, φ〉n = 〈φn−1(g) · · ·φ2(g) · φ(g) · g, φn 〉 for an n ∈ N he
privately chooses. He then sends only the first component to Alice. Thus,
he sends Alice only b = φn−1(g) · · ·φ2(g) · φ(g) · g of the (semi)group G.
3. Alice computes 〈b, x〉 · 〈a, φm〉 = 〈φm(b) ·a, x ·φm〉. Her key is now of the form
KA = φ
m(b) · a. Note that she does not actually “compute” x · φm because she
does not know the automorphism x = φn (since it is not transmitted to her,
and she does not need it to compute KA.)
4. Bob computes 〈a, y〉 · 〈b, φn〉 = 〈φn(a) ·b, y ·φn〉. His key is now KB = φn(a) ·b.
Similar to Alice, Bob does not actually “compute” y · φn because he does not
know the automorphism y = φm.
5. Since 〈b, x〉 · 〈a, φm〉 = 〈a, y〉 · 〈b, φn〉 = 〈g, φ〉m+n, we have the shared secret
key K := KA = KB.
The protocol we will describe in the following section is similar but more general:
the platform group G does not need to be a semidirect product, but it can be any
reliable group platform with a subgroup H, which itself does not have to be normal
in G. To be more precise, our procedure relies on decomposition of a group G into
a set T × H, where T is a transversal from the set of cosets G/H for a subgroup
H < G. The set T ×H can be made into a group T ·H by defining the product as
〈t1, h1〉·〈t2, h2〉 := 〈 t1h1t2 , δ(t1h1, t2)h2 〉 (4.1.1)
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for any 〈t1, h1〉, 〈t2, h2〉 ∈ T ×H, where k denotes the representative of k ∈ G in
G/H and δ(g, t) := ( g t )
-1
g t (see theorem 3.5.2, Chapter 3, for the derivation of this
equation.) In other words, the product of any two elements in G of the form g1 = t1h1
and g2 = t2h2 , may be expressed by the normal form
g1 g2 = t1h1t2 δ(t1h1, t2)h2
from the set { th | t ∈ T, h ∈ H }, where t1h1t2 ∈ T and δ(t1h1, t2)h2 ∈ H. Now, in
order to describe our protocol, we only have to determine the expression of the power
of an element 〈t, h〉 from the group T ·H.
Theorem 4.1.2. Let T be a transversal of G/H and g ∈ G be of the from g = th,
where t ∈ T and h ∈ H. Then the expression of g as 〈t, h〉 in T ·H satisfies
∀ n ∈N
[
〈t, h〉n+1 = 〈 gnt , δ(gnt, t)h 〉
]
(4.1.2)
Proof : Let g ∈ G be of the from g = th such that g is expressible as 〈t, h〉 in TH,
where t ∈ T and h ∈ H. First, suppose n = 1 in (4.1.2). Then
〈t, h〉 1+1 = 〈t, h〉 · 〈t, h〉 = 〈 tht , δ(tht, t)h 〉 = 〈 g1t , δ(g1t, t)h 〉
since g = th. Next, suppose equation (4.1.2) is satisfiable up to n ∈ N. Then,
〈t, h〉n+1 = 〈t, h〉 · 〈t, h〉n = 〈t, h〉 · 〈 g(n−1)t , δ(g(n−1)t, t)h 〉 − a priori induction;
= 〈 thg(n−1) t , δ(th, g (n−1)t) δ(g (n−1) t, t)h 〉 . (4.1.3)
Now thg(n−1) t = thg(n−1) t and δ(th, g(n−1) t) δ(g(n−1) t, t) = δ(thg(n−1) t, t) by
lemma 3.2.3 and lemma 3.4.1. Then equation (4.1.3) becomes
〈t, h〉n+1 = 〈 gg(n−1) t , δ(gg(n−1) t, t)h 〉 = 〈 gn t , δ(g nt, t)h 〉 ,
again, since g = th. 2
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4.2 A Transversal Key-Exchange Protocol
Let T be a transversal of G/H and g ∈ G of the form 〈t, h〉 ∈ T × H. Both Alice
and Bob are going to work with elements of the form
〈t, h〉 r+1 = 〈 gr t , δ(gr t, t)h 〉 (4.2.1)
for a power r ∈ N, where Bob and Alice will choose a private n ∈ N and m ∈ N for
r, respectively (cf. theorem 4.1.2.)
Protocol Assumptions: Let G be a group and H a subgroup of G.
1. A transversal set T of G/H is chosen, and it is made public along with an
arbitrary element g ∈ G of the form 〈t, h〉 ∈ T ×H.
2. Alice chooses a private n ∈ N and Bob chooses a private m ∈ N.
Key-Exchange Protocol: Alice and Bob generate a key from g ∈ G as follows.
1. Alice computes 〈t, h〉n+1 = 〈 g nt, δ(g nt, t)h 〉 and sends only the first
component to Bob, i.e., she sends only the element a := g nt in T .
2. Bob computes 〈t, h〉m+1 = 〈 gmt, δ(gmt, t)h 〉 and sends only the first
component to Alice, i.e., he sends only the element b := gmt in T .
3. Alice computes g nb = g ngmt = g ngmt = g n+mt . Her key is now set to
be KA = g n+mt.
4. Bob computes gma = gmg nt = gmg nt = gm+nt . His key is now set to be
KB = gm+nt.
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Now since g n+mt = gm+nt , Alice and Bob share K := KA = KB as their secret key.
Remark. Notice that both Alice and Bob share the first component of
〈t, h〉(n+m)+1 = 〈 g n+mt, δ(g n+mt, t)h 〉
in T ·H. Moreover, similar to the remark made by by Kahrobaei and Shpilrain, the
contrast between our protocol and the generic Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol
is based on the equality g ngmt = g ngmt = g n+mt rather than (gn)m = (gn)m = hnm.
This maneuver would not work in the Diffie-Hellman set up, because, if the shared
key K was just the product of two openly transmitted elements, then anybody could
determine the shared key.
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